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Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
JETEM/계량경제학보/計量經濟學報/JKES
Journal of the Korean Econometric Society

Correlation on Belief and Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games

Vol.18, No.4, December , 52–61



  •   (School of Economics, Yonsei University, Korea)

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Abstract  

This paper presents an example in which players never learn to play Nash equilibrium in the repeated games when one believes that others are correlating their strategies, though his belief satisfies `a grain of truth' condition. A sufficient condition on the learning procedure to restore the convergence is suggested and turns out to be quite demanding.


Keywords
   Repeated game, Bayesian learning, convergence to Nash equilibrium, correlation

JEL classification codes
   C72, D83
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