Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics: Journal of the Korean Econometric Society
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Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
JETEM/계량경제학보/計量經濟學報/JKES
Journal of the Korean Econometric Society

The Decay in Contributions in a Public Goods Game: Learning Hypothesis, Strategy Hypothesis and Reciprocity Hypothesis Revisited

Vol.23, No.2, June , 165–186


English Version |  Korean Version
  •   (Kyungpook National University)

  •   (Seoul National University)

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Abstract  

Most studies on public goods game reported that in a finitely repeated public good game subjects' contributions begin with an average contribution of about 50% of their initial endowment and decay toward the free riding level as the game progresses. Unconditional free ridings were seldom observed. To explain what causes this behavioral patterns, three hypotheses have been suggested; learning hypothesis, strategy hypothesis and reciprocity hypothesis. This paper investigates these hypotheses, and our findings from public goods experiments suggest that subjects' reciprocity is one of the main causes that produce subjects' behavioral patterns.


Keywords
   Public Goods Game, Learning Hypothesis, Strategy Hypothesis, Reciprocity Hypothesis.

JEL classification codes
   D03, C91
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