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Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Journal of the Korean Econometric Society
Coalitionally Strategy-proof Boting Rules for Separable Weak Orderings
Vol.18, No.4, December 2007, 43–51
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Biung-Ghi Ju
(Department of Economics, Korea University)
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Abstract
In the framework of multiple objects choice (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems) with separable preferences (weak ordering), we characterize a family of voting rules that satisfy coalitional strategy-proofness, which requires that no group of agents can benefit simultaneously by jointly misrepresenting their preferences.
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Keywords
Coalitional strategy-proofness, Strategy-proofness, Separable preferences, Voting |
JEL classification codes
D70, D71, D72 |
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