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Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
JETEM/계량경제학보/計量經濟學報/JKES
Journal of the Korean Econometric Society

Coalitionally Strategy-proof Boting Rules for Separable Weak Orderings

Vol.18, No.4, December , 43–51



  •   (Department of Economics, Korea University)

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Abstract  

In the framework of multiple objects choice (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems) with separable preferences (weak ordering), we characterize a family of voting rules that satisfy coalitional strategy-proofness, which requires that no group of agents can benefit simultaneously by jointly misrepresenting their preferences.


Keywords
   Coalitional strategy-proofness, Strategy-proofness, Separable preferences, Voting

JEL classification codes
   D70, D71, D72
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