Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics: Journal of the Korean Econometric Society

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Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Journal of the Korean Econometric Society

Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics (JETEM) is a peer-reviewed, internet-based, open-access international journal aiming to publish high-quality papers in all areas of economics. JETEM is the official publication of the Korean Econometric Society, carrying papers written either in English or in Korean. In this web-site, all English articles are fully downloadable free of charge; for Korean articles, only the title and the abstract in English are provided along with a fee-based link to the full text.

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Recently Published Articles

Volume 31, Issue 4 (December 2020)

Abstract | PDF (135 kilobytes)

No abstract is available for this article.

Equilibrium in Constrained Financial Markets, Pages 1–40

Guangsug Hahn, Dong Chul Won

Abstract | PDF (265 kilobytes)

Redundant assets give rise to peculiar portfolios, called `link portfolios,' under portfolio constraints. Link portfolios are jointly spanned by constrained null-income portfolios and form a linear subspace. The paper provides a general methodology for showing the existence of equilibrium under portfolio constraints by building two theoretical pillars to deal with link portfolios. The two pillars consist of the fundamental theorem of portfolio decomposition and the allocational equivalence between the original economy and the artificial economy built from projecting away link portfolios from the portfolio constraints. Investigating the existence of equilibrium in constrained financial markets boils down to finding a sufficient condition for the fundamental theorem of portfolio constraints to hold. The sufficient condition of the paper is general enough to encompass other sufficient conditions of the literature.

Influences of Reciprocity on a Consumer Boycott in an Experiment, Pages 41–68

Dooseok Jang

Abstract | PDF (1833 kilobytes)

By conducting a boycott experiment, this paper studied whether the reciprocity of consumers affects boycott decision. The boycott experiment is a two-stage post-offer market game, in which a seller first decides an asking price and then consumers decide to purchase goods after observing the asking price. To find the effect of reciprocity on consumer's purchase decision, the level of information provided to the consumers corresponding to the previous asking price and another consumer's boycott history, on average, was modified. Consequently, the sellers lowered the asking price with the belief that disclosing additional information about their previous profit fractions decreases the consumer's purchase frequency. Moreover, consumers' purchase frequency is affected by both the given value of the goods and the asking price, but not by the different levels of information provided. Therefore, the consumers appear to have no reciprocity preferences on a boycott.

Estimation of Residential Electricity Demand in Korea Allowing for a Structural Break, Pages 69–85

Seong Yeon Chang

Abstract | PDF (149 kilobytes)

This study examines the time series characteristics of residential electricity demand and its determinants in Korea and the short-run and long-run relationship among them. We employ unit root tests, cointegration, and error-correction models on annual time series for the period 1972--2019. The rapid development of Korea over this period provides clear evidence of the possibility of structural breaks. We find that residential electricity demand and its determinants are trend-stationary processes with a slope change, which implies that there is no need to invoke cointegration methods under the unit root assumption. We expect that the essential modeling strategy presented in this article will be widely applicable.

Incentive to Raise Rivals' Costs: Patent Licensing in Vertically Integrated Markets, Pages 86–96

Chongmin Kim

Abstract | PDF (131 kilobytes)

A key input manufacturer with a patent can raise its rivals’ costs in upstream market either by raising the possibility of patent infringement litigation in case a license is not given or by raising the royalty in case a license is given to its rivals. We study under which scenarios the patent holder has more incentive to raise its rivals’ costs. There is related literature investigating the patent holder’s incentive to license its technology to its rivals such as Farrell and Gallini (1988), Rockett (1990), and Conner (1995) or investigating the vertically integrated input monopolists’ (or the patent holder’s) incentive to supply its input to its rivals such as Padilla and Wong-Ervin (2016) and Moresi and Schwartz (2017). This paper differs from those in that the patent holder allows its rivals to use its patent even without a license but keeps the option of patent litigation. That is, the patent holder has an option to grant a license to its rivals in the input market, called the component licensing, or to allow free access to its rivals and to give a license to the device manufacturers, called the end-product licensing. We show that in the component licensing model the patent holder has more incentive to raise its rivals’ costs.


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