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The paper analyses the labour market effects of the Syrian refugees on Turkish natives. Results suggest that there are no negative effects on native employment, but there is a compositional change in the labour market. On the contrary, there is evidence for positive effects on formal employment which is confirmed by the administrative data. By gender, results are differentiated in a systematic way. For men, while there is an increase in formal employment, informal employment decreases. Results are the opposite for women. There is a reduction in formal employment but no significant change in informal female employment. These results suggest that while refugees are substitutes for women in the formal market and men in the informal market, they are complements to formal male workers.

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We build a model of social enterprise that shows how social planners incentivize for-profit firms to pursue social welfare maximization. In our model, there is a social planner who provides an incentive program for an entrant firm to be a social enterprise. The amount of subsidy given to the social enterprise is proportional to the difference of a reference price and the price set by the entrant. The entrant firm decides whether to participate in the incentive program and maximize social welfare or to compete with an incumbent firm without any subsidy from the social planner. Several results emerge from our analysis. First, we identify conditions under which the entrant firm has an incentive to maximize social welfare by receiving the subsidy. The degree of such an incentive increases as the market size increases or the incumbent sells a low quality product. If the incentive program has the incumbent's monopolistic price as the reference price, it is more efficient than if the program has a competitive price as the reference price.

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We extend the LEN moral hazard model to allow for adverse selection and derive the optimal incentive contract menu. We show that both moral hazard and adverse selection separately cause compensation disparity between agents with different degrees of risk aversion. We also show that adverse selection aggravates the compensation disparity when more risk averse agents form a minority of the agent population.

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This paper introduces dynamic mechanism design in an elementary fashion. We first examine optimal dynamic mechanisms: We find necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect Bayesian incentive compatibility and formulate the optimal dynamic mechanism problem. We next examine efficient dynamic mechanisms: We establish the uniqueness of Groves mechanism and investigate budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism in some detail for a bilateral trading environment. This introduction reveals that many results and techniques of static mechanism design can be straightforwardly extended and adapted to the analysis of dynamic settings.