Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics: Journal of the Korean Econometric Society
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Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
JETEM/계량경제학보/計量經濟學報/JKES
Journal of the Korean Econometric Society

Volume 35, Issue 3 (September 2024)




Cover
Abstract | PDF (151 kilobytes)

No abstract is available for this article.


The Cannibalization Effect of Food Delivery Platforms on Sales, Pages 1–12

Kyeongbae Kim, Gong Lee

Abstract | PDF (116 kilobytes)

Utilizing novel credit card transaction data from 2020 that encompass all Korean restaurants, we quantify the restaurant-level impact of platform sales on total restaurant sales and the degree of cannibalization of other sales channels, including on-premise dining and takeout orders. We observe a robust positive effect of platform sales on total sales, with limited cannibalization effects on other sales. For each additional Korean won earned from food delivery platforms, total sales revenue increases by 0.858 to 0.965 won, while the platforms cannibalize between
0.035 to 0.142 won from other sales. Notably, while the extent of cannibalization varies by restaurant type, substantial sales growth is observed across all restaurant types.


The Spatial Econometric Analysis on Democracy and Economic Determinants of Official Development Assistance: Evidence from Korea, Pages 13–48

Chae-Deug Yi

Abstract | PDF (219 kilobytes)

This study analyzes the determinants affecting Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) to recipient countries using spatial econometric models, unlike most studies. We tested whether the recipient country’s democracy level or political stability, the distance between Korea and the recipient country, trade, GDP, world ODA, and world FDI have an impact on the determinants of Korea’s ODA to recipient countries. The empirical results revealed that Korea’s ODA is impacted by spatial dependence effects. The spatial empirical models showed that while the democracy level of recipient countries, distance, recipient country’s GDP, and world ODA seem to positively influence Korea’s ODA, Korea’s trade does not affect its ODA to recipient countries. The distance between countries is not inversely related to ODA, unlike the trade gravity models. The spatial error-correction estimation with combined spatial effects also shows both spatial effects in the short run. Thus, the country needs to consider the spatial effects of the determinants of ODA to create more effective ODA policies.


An Analysis of the Macroeconomic Effects of Property Tax Reform, Pages 49–70

Byoung Hoon Seok

Abstract | PDF (227 kilobytes)

This study analyzed the macroeconomic effects of property tax reform using a two-sector general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households. This study found that increasing the property tax rate by 0.1 % points only for households owing homes with a value in the top 20% in the benchmark economy leads to the largest reduction in housing asset inequality compared to the benchmark economy. However, welfare decreased when the property tax rate is raised. In most cases, the welfare loss is lower when the excess tax revenue is distributed equally to all households through transfers, as opposed to using it for government spending.


Sequential Tariffs in Cournot and Bertrand Competition, Pages 71–94

Seonyoung Lim, Kangsik Choi

Abstract | PDF (186 kilobytes)

We examine the welfare implication of the sequential tariff game between discriminatory and uniform tariff rates in which the importing country imposes tariffs on asymmetric foreign exporters. Under Cournot competition, the importing country has an incentive to manipulate the tariff structure through sequential tariffs. Imposing the sequential uniform tariff improves consumer surplus, as well as social and global welfare, when the cost difference is small. In contrast, under Bertrand competition, the importing country always prefers the simultaneous tariff over the sequential tariff. As a result, the importing country prefers the simultaneous discriminatory tariff to the uniform tariff under Bertrand competition. Moreover, consumer surplus, social and global welfare with the simultaneous discriminatory tariff under Bertrand competition are greater than with the sequential uniform or the discriminatory tariff under Cournot competition.

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