Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics: Journal of the Korean Econometric Society
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Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
JETEM/계량경제학보/計量經濟學報/JKES
Journal of the Korean Econometric Society

Joint Recruitment of Public Institutions: Who Gains and Who Loses?

Vol.31, No.1, March , 14–65


English Version |  Korean Version
  •   (Yonsei University)

  •   (Yonsei University)

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Abstract  

Recently, the Korean government is promoting the joint recruitment of public institutions, in which public institutions performing a similar task set a common date of written tests for entry-level employment. In this study, we analyze the effects of this policy on job seekers and institutions. Using a game-theoretic model with two institutions and a continuum of job seekers, we obtain the following results. First, when job seekers’ preferences for the two institutions are identical and one institution is much preferred to the other one, the less preferred institution and job seekers suffer from joint recruitment because job opportunities at the less preferred institution are not fully utilized under joint recruitment. On the other hand, when each institution is preferred by a half of job seekers, joint recruitment improves the overall utility of job seekers by increasing the likelihood that job seekers enter their preferred institutions. If joint recruitment lowers the overall difficulty of getting a job, it benefits job seekers with low ability more than those with high ability. Based on these results, we evaluate the policy of joint recruitment and discuss policy alternatives.


Keywords
   Joint Recruitment, Public Institutions, Job Market, Matching

JEL classification codes
   C78, D02, J45
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