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Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Journal of the Korean Econometric Society
A Stag Hunt Game with Social Norms
Vol.24, No.3, September 2013, 306–319
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Seung Han Yoo
(Department of Economics, Korea University)
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Abstract
This paper studies a stag hunt game in which each player's payoff depends on the level of social norms in a community. First, we establish conditions under which without social norms, there exists a unique equilibrium regarding the cooperation level, but with social norms, there can be multiple equilibria. Second, we provide the comparative statics analysis such that for a statics framework, the local stability of an interior equilibrium works as a sufficient condition under which the cooperation level increases as the degree of social norms increases; and for a dynamic framework, the cooperation level always increases with social norms.
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Keywords
Stag hunt game, Social norms |
JEL classification codes
D71 |
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