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Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
JETEM/계량경제학보/計量經濟學報/JKES
Journal of the Korean Econometric Society

Belief Structure in Ultimatum Bargaining Game

Vol.16, No.4, December , 1–22



  •   (Department of Economics, Sogang University)

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Abstract  

This paper investigates the belief structure in the ultimatum bargaining game to test whether people care only about the pecuniary payoffs. In the normal-form quantal response equilibrium model, the responder's choice is made taking the proposer's intention into account while is independent in the agent normal-form game. Using Slonim and Roth's (1998, Econometrica) experimental data, it is shown that the experimental subjects who played the role of the responder cared not only the pecuniary payoffs but also the fairness of the amount of offers.


Keywords
   Quantal-Response Equilibrium, Ultimatum Bargaining Game, Backward Induction, Fairness

JEL classification codes
   C79, C92
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